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i. PReFACe: no HiDinG THe eLePHAnT(S) in THe RooM
We face an unparalleled crisis in the federal government’s ability to do the nation’s business. ...
At this point in U.S. history, it is particularly important that the government address the use 
of contractors. ... The new administration should not try to fool the American people, 
perpetuating the myth of smaller government by not counting the hordes of service 
contractors it engages. ... Clearly, there are things that should be contracted and that the 
government need not and should not undertake, but the unfettered use of contractors has 
skyrocketed and must be brought under control.
Bernard Rostker, A Call to Revitalize the Engines of Government at 1, 15 (RAND Corp. Occasional 
Paper 2008) (emphasis added), available at www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_
OP240.pdf.
GSA’s procurement organization awards and administers government-wide contracts worth $40 
to $50 billion. With growing programs and shrinking numbers of qualified acquisition 
personnel, attention to important fundamentals, such as ensuring competition, 
meaningful price analysis, and implementation of statutory and regulatory 
compliance-type requirements has diminished.
Inspector General, General Services Administration, Semiannual Report to the Congress, April 1, 2008 – Sep-
tember 30, 2008 (emphasis added), available at www.gsa.gov/gsa/cm_attachments/GSA_DOCUMENT/ 
OIG_SAR0408-0908Nonweb_R20-mF_0Z5RDZ-i34K-pR.pdf.
DOD increasingly relies on contractors during expeditionary operations to perform 
a wide range of services. For example, more contractors are working for DOD in Iraq and 
Afghanistan than are U.S. military personnel. As a result, military personnel in the field are 
increasingly interacting with and responsible for managing contractors. Yet many observers 
argue that the military is not sufficiently prepared to manage contractors during 
expeditionary missions.
Moshe Schwartz, Training the Military to Manage Contractors During Expeditionary Operations: 
Overview and Options for Congress (Congressional Research Service, Dec. 17, 2008) (emphasis added); 
see also, Jennifer K. Elsea et al., Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and 
Other Issues (CRS, Updated Sept. 29, 2008).
ii. CHALLenGeS FoR THe oBAMA ADMiniSTRATion: WHeRe To BeGin?
Last year, while we anticipated that the Presidential candidates might jockey to score points by 
excoriating high-profile procurement failures, we did not expect them to commence a serious national 
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conversation demanding: (1) an unprecedented effort to hire, train, and 
integrate the huge cadre of highly skilled business professionals neces-
sary to manage the Govenrment’s burgeoning contractor workforce (upon 
which the nation’s functioning depends); (2) a massive Govenrment hiring 
binge – civilian and military – required to staff the Govenrment’s current 
mandates (if, as a nation, we truly desire to depend less upon contractors); 
or (3) a significant reduction in the services that the Govenrment provides 
to the public (ranging from defense – at home and abroad – to air traffic 
control and food safety). But, now, the President-elect must govern, and 
difficult decisions await.
In a nutshell, the Obama administration faces a number of inter- 
related, critical, systemic challenges that pervade the procurement and/or 
acquisition landscape. Federal procurement spending has exploded in 
this decade. As a result—and, in addition to decisions made during the 
1990’s—the Govenrment is heavily outsourced. Specifically, the Federal 
Govenrment is dependent upon contractors to an extent – in degree and 
in type – that makes many uncomfortable. To exacerbate matters, the 
Govenrment lacks a sufficient acquisition workforce to responsibly man-
age its cadre of contractors (including an increasingly blended—military-
contractor, civil servant-contractor, and/or military-civil servant-contrac-
tor—workforce).
While this is true throughout the Govenrment, the failure to plan and 
staff the acquisition function in Iraq (and Afghanistan) has generated (and 
will continue to generate) bad procurement news and erode confidence in 
the public procurement process. The poster child for all of these macro-level 
issues has been the Govenrment’s ill-conceived and poorly-orchestrated 
(direct and indirect) reliance on arms-bearing (or private security) contrac-
tors in the battle area. Thus, the foreseeable future will be dominated by 
a deeply ingrained, broad-based (public, media, Congressional) anti-con-
tractor sentiment. This sentiment will manifest in the form of initiatives 
intended to achieve greater (pick your label) accountability, compliance, 
corruption control, ethics, integrity, transparency, etc. Sadly, few of these 
initiatives will originate bearing in mind the old adage that “an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure.” The primary beneficiaries of the new 
compliance regime will be attorneys, accountants, auditors, and investi-
gators. But without a dramatic, sustained investment in the acquisition 
workforce, none of this will lead to Govenrment enjoying greater value 
for the taxpayers’ dollars. All of which signals turbulent times ahead, 
whether or not the new administration embarks upon an epochal public 
works program that would continue (or continue to fuel) the breathtaking 
increases in procurement spending that have spanned this new century.
iii. UPWARD TRenD: THe PRoCUReMenT SPenDinG  
JUGGeRnAUT
Throughout this decade, we’ve marveled at the increased volume and 
rate of federal procurement spending. We assumed that the growth would 
taper, and, to some extent, the growth rate had slowed somewhat—until 
Fiscal Year 2007, and then Fiscal Year 2008. The consistent, dire, annual 
warnings that the post-millennial spending increase was a blip, and that a 
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spending contraction was imminent, never transitioned into fact. Further, 
signs remain that the growth cycle has not yet run its course. And, lest 
one forget, it is striking how dramatically the rapid growth in contracting 
continues to outpace the rate of inflation. 
Federal Procurement Spending
2000-2008*
Fiscal
Year
Procurement Spending 
(in Billions)
% Increase From 
Previous Year
% Increase in Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)
2008 $531.2 >11.5
2007 $465.6 12.0 2.8
2006 $415.4 6.6 3.2
2005 $389.6 8.9 3.4
2004 $357.7 9.6 2.7
2003 $326.4 18.6 2.3
2002 $275.2 17.0 1.6
2001 $235.2 7.2 2.8
2000 $219.3  
*FY 2008 reflects preliminary reporting.
See Federal Procurement Data System, Trending Analysis Report, 
available at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/top_requests/FPDSNG5Year 
ViewOnTotals.xls, and Agencies Submitting Data to FPDS-NG, available 
at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/agency_data_submit_list.htm. Annual 
increases in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) 
were extracted from the annual Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm#2008. 
The rate of growth in federal procurement spending not only exceeded 
the rate of increases in the consumer price index (CPI) in this decade; 
the procurement spending pace annually more than doubled the rate of 
inflation. Indeed, procurement spending growth more than tripled the 
rate of inflation in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, and (apparently) 2008. Putting 
this together, in this decade, federal procurement spending rose at a rate 
well in excess of five times the rate of inflation. And, with a number of ag-
gressive public works initiatives being considered, that might accelerate, 
rather than decline.
iV. oUTSoURCinG, ConTRACTinG oUT, PRiVATizATion 
– enD oF A TRenD oR A neW BeGinninG?
The Govenrment’s bipartisan outsourcing (or, at times, “competitive 
sourcing”) initiative now spans more than fifteen years (and two two-term 
administrations). See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner & Daniel S. Greenspahn, 
Too Dependent on Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible 
Governance, 6 J. Cont. mGmt 9 (Summer 2008), available at ssrn.com/
abstract=1263358.
Looking ahead, an apparent disconnect is brewing between aspiration 
and reality. “Obama … wants to make federal buying systems more efficient 
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and … reduce federal spending by $40 billion by using fewer contrac-
tors.” Robert O’Harrow Jr., Like Clinton, Obama Calls for Fewer Federal 
Contractors to Cut Spending, Wash. Post (Nov. 11, 2008) (emphasis added); 
see also, change.gov/agenda/defense_agenda: “Reform Contracting ... 
[R]equire the Pentagon and State … to develop a strategy for determin-
ing when contracting makes sense, rather than continually handing off 
governmental jobs to well-connected companies.”
[Obama] is concerned by the rising number of government 
contractors that are often unaccountable and frequently less 
efficient than government workers. … [He] will reduce our 
nation’s increasing dependence on private contractors in 
sensitive or inherently governmental functions. [He] will 
eliminate the … ideological bias towards outsourcing …  
and abandon initiatives, like … private bill collectors to collect 
federal taxes, that are a demonstrated waste of taxpayer 
money.
Joe Davidson, If I Were the Boss, Wash. Post D01 (Aug. 20, 2008) (emphasis 
added). Conversely, long before his inauguration, President-elect Obama 
described an American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan. In addition to 
tax breaks for an inclusive class of workers, the President-elect identified 
a number of initiatives – intended to generate millions of new jobs – 
that suggest the potential for significant growth in public procurement, 
particularly in what might be referred to as public works. Initiatives 
include the repair, improvement, and/or replacement of roads and bridges 
as well as “rebuilding our crumbling ... schools [and] … build[ing] 21st 
century classrooms, labs, and libraries.” The construction industry must 
be intrigued by the aspiration to “renovate public buildings to make them 
more energy efficient.” The IT community must be heartened by a call to 
“update and computerize our health care system to cut red tape, prevent 
medical mistakes, and help reduce health care costs.” Of course, this runs 
contrary to a fair amount of pre- and post-campaign rhetoric suggesting 
that the administration would endeavor to reduce the number of contrac-
tors that serve the (federal) Govenrment. But, it may prove consistent if 
the lion’s share of the federal infrastructure spending, specifically the 
public works contracts, actually takes place at the state, rather than the 
federal, level.
For an historical perspective, see generally, Tom Huntington, America’s 
Top 10 Public Works Projects: Since our nation’s founding, politicians have 
debated how far the federal government should go in supporting large 
infrastructure projects, amerICan herItaGe’s InventIon & teChnoloGY 
(Winter 2009, Vol. 23, No. 4). Huntington suggests the President-elect has 
articulated: “Worthy ideals—but only time will tell whether the results 
are more Hoover Dam or Big Dig.” Huntington’s (highly subjective) top 
10 projects include:
• The National Road (started in 1811);
• First Transcontinental Railroad (200,000 net tons of iron);
• Hoover Dam (5,000,000 barrels of concrete);
• Air Traffic Control (14,305 controllers, 87,000 flights per day);
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• Oregon Coastal Highway Bridge System (3,223-foot-long Yaqui-
na Bay Bridge);
• Lincoln Tunnel (nearly 120,000 vehicles per day);
• The Tennessee Valley Authority (29 hydroelectric dams, 3,526 
megawatts);
• Interstate Highway System (46,837 miles);
• The Big Dig (estimated: $2.6 billion; real cost: $14.6 billion); and
• The Internet (1.46 billion users).
See also, generally, Administration Opposes Contractor Limits, 50 GC 
¶ 336; Quarter of Intelligence Workers Are Contractors, ODNI Finds, 50 
GC ¶ 324; Public-Private Partnerships Need DOD-Wide, Measurable Goals, 
GAO Says, 50 GC ¶ 256; Competitive Sourcing Continues Savings, OMB 
Says: Unions Disagree, 50 GC ¶ 179; House Panelists: Contractors May 
be Performing Inherently Governmental Tasks, 50 GC ¶ 94; OFPP Issues 
Public-Private Competition Guidance, 50 GC ¶ 68; Forest Service Should 
Improve Management of Competitive Sourcing Program, GAO Says, 50 
GC ¶ 67; DoD IG, Report to Congress on Section 325 of the “National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008”, OMB Influence Over DoD 
Public-Private Competitions (No. D-2009-034, Dec. 15, 2008) (“We found 
no indication that OMB was either directing or requiring the Secretary 
of Defense or Secretary of a Military Department to undertake a public-
private competition under OMB Circular No. A-76.”).
V. ACqUiSiTion WoRkFoRCe: ACTion  
(BUT inSUFFiCienT URGenCY)
Last year, we conceded that we were disappointed, but are no longer 
surprised, that the debate over the need to restore—and dramatically in-
vest in—the acquisition workforce continues. All of the empirical–macro 
and micro–and anecdotal evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion 
that there are too few qualified acquisition professionals to meet the 
Govenrment’s needs today and for the foreseeable future. The good news 
is that, in 2008, the issue was seriously addressed—both as a matter of 
policy and legislation. See, e.g., change.gov/agenda/defense_agenda/: 
“Obama … will restore the government’s ability to manage contracts by 
rebuilding our contract[ing] officer corps.” The bad news is that insufficient 
progress is being made to solve the core problems.
To review, once again, the federal acquisition workforce declined dra-
matically due to congressionally mandated personnel reductions in the 
mid-1990’s; arguably, the Govenrment has not hired an appropriate number 
of new acquisition professionals in any year since the 1980’s; the existing 
workforce is aging and, in large part, retirement eligible (here, apparently, 
the recession/economic instability may prove a boon, by keeping these pro-
fessionals on the Govenrment payroll); the lion’s share of that workforce 
was neither hired nor trained to primarily purchase services using flexible 
contractual vehicles; and, as discussed above, the volume of purchasing has 
increased (or, as some might, say, exploded) in this decade.
Acquisition Workload and Ineffective Oversight Remain Top Concerns, 
PSC Finds, 50 GC ¶ 433; Professional Services Council, Acquisition in 
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Transition: Workforce, Oversight and Mission (Oct. 2008) (“As has been 
the case in all previous surveys, workforce issues were the number one 
challenge and area of focus.... The dollar amount and complexity of procure-
ment has increased dramatically while the number and, in many cases, 
capability of acquisition professionals has stayed constant or decreased.”), 
available at www.pscouncil.org/pdfs/2008PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.
pdf; DHS Needs Better Strategic Approach for Acquisition Workforce, 
GAO Finds, 50 GC ¶ 427; USAID Needs Overseas Acquisition Workforce 
Strategy, GAO Says, 50 GC ¶ 362; IG Report Questions Homeland Se-
curity Acquisition Personnel Training Oversight, 50 GC ¶ 223; Senate 
Subcommittee Assesses the Acquisition Workforce, 50 GC ¶ 57. For a 
more optimistic perspective, see, Special Edition: AT&L Human Capital 
Initiatives, Defense at&l (DAU, Nov.-Dec. 2008), available at www.dau.
mil/pubs/dam/2008_11_12/nov-dec08.pdf; AT&L Human Capital Stra-
tegic Plan v 3.0 (“In addition to the original five goals for AT&L human 
capital management, the plan incorporates a sixth goal entitled ‘Recruit, 
develop and retain a mission-ready workforce through comprehensive 
talent management.’”), www.dau.mil/workforce/hcsp.pdf. DAU points 
out that “[t]he DoD AT&L workforce is highly educated, experienced, and 
well trained...” when compared to “the current federal civilian workforce” 
and “federal employees” generally. Id. (emphasis added).
It’s wonderful to see some leadership on these issues. But any perceived 
gains achieved in 2008, were swamped by the continued growth in pur-
chasing. Thus, the only progress made so far in addressing the workforce 
crisis is recognition of the problem.
Vi. iRAq, AFGHAniSTAn, AnD PRiVATe SeCURiTY: CASe 
STUDieS, LeSSonS LeARneD, UnAnSWeReD  
qUeSTionS, BUT FeW MoDeLS
A. A Wealth of issues to Study. By any measure, as the security 
situation has stabilized in Iraq, the staffing and quality of the acquisition 
process have improved. A second (revised) edition is circulating of Con-
tingency Contracting: A Joint Handbook (although it is unclear whether 
comments on the draft were due, or the new edition would be available, 
by Dec. 19, 2008). The old version is available for download at acc.dau.
mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=168819&lang=en-US, but (at the time 
these documents were submitted) the website still noted that: “AFLMA 
is currently out of the JCC Handbooks. Another 2000 copies have been 
ordered and should be available the end of Sep 08.”
Although the acquisition process has stabilized, the steady stream of 
bad news – detailing poorly planned projects, ill-conceived and drafted 
contracts, poorly managed work, as well as criminal behavior – will not 
only continue, but likely will accelerate. Such an outcome is unavoidable, 
as the Govenrment’s audit, oversight, and investigation resources have 
increased far more dramatically than the acquisition workforce needed to 
remedy the problems that will continue to be uncovered. See, generally, 
Chris Gagne, U.S. Contingency Contracting: Reassessing the Battlefield, 
5 IGC ¶ 81 (“opportunities … come with a steep price: heightened scrutiny 
and … an increased risk of allegations, investigations, prosecutions and 
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bad press”); Better Financial Data Needed On PSCs, SIGIR Finds, 50 GC 
¶ 408; SIGIR Reports on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Cancellations, 50 GC 
¶ 400 (noting that, as of June 30, the Govenrment had terminated 1,262 
Iraq reconstruction projects, including 530 default terminations); GAO 
Examines Contractor Use in Iraq, Afghanistan, 50 GC ¶ 372; DOD Contract 
Management Positions in Iraq and Afghanistan Remain Understaffed, 
GAO Says, 50 GC ¶ 375; USAID Needs Overseas Acquisition Workforce 
Strategy, GAO Says, 50 GC ¶ 362; CBO Examines Contractor Use in Iraq, 
50 GC ¶ 303, Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of U.S. 
Operations in Iraq (Aug. 2008); GAO Reports on PSC Oversight Progress, 
50 GC ¶ 293; SBA IG Reports on Waxman’s Blackwater Allegation, 50 
GC ¶ 283; Senate Committee Questions Army Contracting Irregularities, 
50 GC ¶ 274; President Orders New Streamlined Standards for Security 
Contractors, 50 GC ¶ 242; Senate Committee Probes Iraq Funding Waste 
and Corruption, 50 GC ¶ 95; State Updates Senate Committee on PSCs, 
50 GC ¶ 86.
B. The Wartime Contracting Commission. As expected, Congress 
mandated the creation of a wartime contracting commission modeled 
after the WWII Truman Commission. See, The Commission on Wartime 
Contracting: Background Information and Chronology, webb.senate.gov/
pdf/wtcontractbg.pdf. The Commission is assembling a credible profes-
sional staff and, by the time of this conference, should have held its first 
public meeting/hearing (scheduled for February 2, 2009). The commission’s 
extremely ambitious mandate could include, among other things: (1) a 
study of reconstruction, logistical support, and security contracting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) a review of the extent of governmental reliance 
upon contractors and the impact of that reliance; (3) an assessment of the 
quality of contractor performance and the mechanisms by which perfor-
mance is measured; (4) an effort to gauge the extent of contractor fraud, 
waste, and abuse and the extent to which responsible parties are held 
accountable; (5) a review of both the DOD’s and the State Department’s 
“organizational structure, policies, practices, and resources” relating to 
program management and contracting; and (6) an assessment of contrac-
tor use and mis-use of force, the law of war, and related issues. 
C. A Glimmer: Transparency into Contractor Fatalities and 
injuries. As of June 30, 2008, more than 1,350 civilian contractor per-
sonnel had died in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of US military and 
political operations. Another 29,000 contractors have been injured; more 
than 8,300 seriously. Yet these fatalities (and injuries) remain generally 
outside the public’s consciousness. That’s a shame, because, in a repre-
sentative democracy, public awareness of the human cost of our nation’s 
security and foreign policies is critical. Most Americans’ perception of 
military success or failure derives from two statistics: the number of 
forces deployed and how many are killed or wounded. The Govenrment’s 
reliance on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan has artificially reduced 
both numbers. See, generally, Steven L. Schooner, Why Contractor Fatali-
ties Matter, 38 Parameters 78 (No. 3, Autumn 2009), available at ssrn.
com/abstract=1303022; Michael Walzer, Mercenary Impulse, the neW 
rePuBlIC (Mar. 12, 2008) (“Using private soldiers makes policy invisible 
and so reduces (or eliminates entirely) its political costs. But it is a crucial 
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feature of democratic decision-making that politicians should pay the costs 
of the decisions they make.”).
Now, however, the Govenrment has begun to at least keep track. See 
generally, GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Con-
tracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan (Oct. 2008) (“As 
directed by the [NDAA] for [FY] 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and 
USAID data on contracting activities in Iraq and Afghanistan for [FY] 
2007 and the first half of [FY] 2008 including (1) the number and value of 
contracts and the extent they were awarded competitively; (2) the number 
of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions; 
and (3) the number of contractor personnel who were killed or wounded.”), 
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d0919.pdf. Unfortunately, the first 
time around: “DOD, State, and USAID were unable to provide complete or 
specific information on the number of contractor personnel who had been 
killed or wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan . . . . [T]hat information . . . was 
not systematically maintained or tracked in a manner that would allow 
agencies to provide us reliable or complete data.” Id. Thus, this mandate 
is new to DOD, State, and AID. The Labor Department generates the data 
quarterly (but only makes it available through Freedom of Information Act 
requests) based upon claims filed because standard Govenrment contract 
clauses (under the Defense Base Act, and the War Hazards Compensa-
tion Act) make contractor employees eligible for worker’s compensation 
benefits pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act. The data reflect insurance claims filed with Labor, but if a contractor’s 
family or employer fails to seek compensation, that death or injury is not 
included.
D. More Transparency: Managing Private Security in Afghani-
stan. “U.S. troop levels are rising, with the likelihood of more increases 
in the year ahead. Given its terrain, poverty, neighborhood, and tragic 
history, Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and 
difficult long-term challenge than Iraq....” Robert M. Gates, A Balanced 
Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age, foreIGn affaIrs 
(Jan./Feb. 2009).
On the issue of transparency and accountability, DoD apparently 
learned from (some of) its mistakes in Iraq and plans to raise the bar for 
both transparency and accountability in Afghanistan. To do so, it plans 
to rely upon contractors. In mid-December, on FedBizOpps.gov, the Army 
posted the following opportunity (for a commercial firm-fixed-price service 
contract, utilizing simplified acquisition procedures): Armed Contractor 
Oversight Directorate (ACOD), Solicitation Number: W91B4N-09-T-5006. 
Among other things,
Contractor shall provide administrative services to manage 
an Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate in support of the 
Combined Joint Task Forces’ contractor management initiatives ...  
at Bagram, Afghanistan....
Contractor must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week … 
[and] work side by side with Government personnel working 
approximately 12 hours per day.... Contractor tasks include:
9-8
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• Process, log, disseminate and monitor [Private Security Compa-
nies] PSC activity. ...
• Assist ... in conducting inspections of PSCs documentation of 
training and incident reporting....
• Track the status of … investigations involving PSC weapons dis-
charges.... 
• Maintain regular contact with Government of the Islamic Re-
public of Afghanistan (GIRoA), Ministry of Interior (MOI) or 
their representative to identify issues concerning … (DOD) con-
tracted PSC’s actions, incidents and procedures. ... [What about 
State, AID, etc.?]
• Work with MOI counterpart in investigations concerning PSC 
Escalation of Force (EOF) incidents. ...
• Act as an interpreter for the ACOD staff for visiting Arabic 
speaking representatives. ... 
• Provide cultural advice to the ACOD staff. ...
• Possess a good understanding of Afghan law and the legal sys-
tem....
• Accumulate data … and performs analysis to identify trends 
concerning PSC activities and incidents. ... [and]
• Develop and maintain database systems capable of querying 
required information requests, manage and update the govern-
ment’s database with the most current information.... 
Yes, the solicitation included the standard FAR clause, 52.237-1 SITE 
VISIT (APR 1984): “Offerors ... are urged and expected to inspect the site 
where services are to be performed and to satisfy themselves regarding 
all general and local conditions that may affect the cost of contract per-
formance, to the extent that the information is reasonably obtainable....” 
See also, Walter Pincus, Despite Concerns, Pentagon Seeks Civilian Firm 
to Oversee Contractors, Wash. Post A33 (Dec. 19, 2008) (“Shortly after an 
[IG] questioned the practice of the Pentagon issuing contracts to admin-
ister contracts, the U.S. Army began advertising … for an American firm 
to manage oversight of private security companies in Afghanistan.”).
e. Rethinking (or Finally Thinking About) Private Security. 
The Govenrment’s direct and indirect employment of as many as 30,000 
arms-bearing contractor personnel in Iraq appears (finally) to have served 
as a catalyst for critical thinking about the proper use and management 
of arms-bearing contractors. See, e.g., Montreux Document on Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed 
Conflict (Sept. 2008) (chock full of useful guidance, such as: “States con-
templating to contract [private military and security companies] PMSCs 
should evaluate whether their legislation, as well as procurement and 
contracting practices, are adequate for contracting PMSCs. This is particu-
larly relevant where Contracting States use the services of a PMSC in a 
State where law enforcement or regulatory capacities are compromised.”), 
available at www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/montreux-docu-
ment-170908; James Cocayne, et al., Beyond Market Forces: A Feasibility 
Study for a Standards Implementation and Enforcement Framework for 
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the Global Security Industry (Fall 2008, public draft) (“[M]ore effective 
standards implementation and enforcement within the Global Security 
Industry is needed…. The three major stakeholder groups – states, in-
dustry and civil society – are already undertaking a number of efforts 
to improve regulation at the national, industry and international levels, 
and through civil society activism.”), available at www.ipinst.org/gsi; 
Roger D. Carstens, et al. Changing the Culture of Pentagon Contracting 
(New America Foundation, Oct. 2008) (“Despite the mostly positive per-
formance of [PSC’s] in Iraq and Afghanistan, their presence in an active 
war zone presents problems, not the least of which is their undermining 
of counterinsurgency efforts, or what might be euphemistically described 
as the attempt to cultivate the “hearts and minds” of the populace. The 
fundamental responsibility of [PSC’s], which is to protect the lives of their 
clients, may run counter to and even undermine the larger U.S. mission.”); 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Agencies Need Improved 
Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors, SIGIR-09-005 
(Oct. 30, 2008) (“[t]here was no financial information on obligations for 
191 companies identified ... as having contracts for some type of security 
services[, and f]inancial data on subcontracts to prime contractors imple-
menting reconstruction programs is limited. DoD, DoS, and USAID are 
not required to routinely track these costs....”), available at www.sigir.
mil/reports/pdf/audits/09-005-f.pdf.
The President-elect’s agenda acknowledges the need to: “expand 
to Meet Military needs on the Ground … and support[s] plans to 
increase the size of the Army by 65,000 soldiers and the Marine Corps 
by 27,000 Marines. Increasing our end strength will help units retrain 
and re-equip properly between deployments and decrease the strain on 
military families.” Yet, surprisingly, the agenda does not appear to sug-
gest further increases sufficient to alleviate the need to rely upon private 
security firms.
For better or worse, Blackwater continues to serve as the poster child 
for the industry:
The [September 16, 2007] Nisoour Square incident [involving 
Blackwater] was broadly proclaimed to be the final straw 
that would force the White House, Congress and the courts to 
come to terms with the complex and often fraught relationship 
between the U.S. military and the increasingly ubiquitous, 
increasingly interoperable private military contractors that it 
hires. ... Accompanying the use of PMCs are costly externalities 
associated with their private-sector status—not only tort and 
contract liability to employees and shareholders, but also 
compliance with corporate statutes and regulations, insurance 
costs, and the incentive structure created by the government 
contracting regime. ... In short, the government’s use of PMCs 
has caused corporate and commercial law to profoundly affect 
the conduct of war, and the consequences remain unstudied.
Rebecca Ulam Weiner, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Private Law, 
Commercial Imperatives and the Privatized Military Industry (Dec. 
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2008), available at belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18725/ 
hidden_costs_of_contracting.html. 
The Blackwater employee indictment relies upon the Military Extra-
territorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3267. See, news.findlaw.
com/nytimes/docs/iraq/blackwater-indictment1208ind.html. Granted, 
the Justice Department did not have a lot of choices, but this feels like 
a stretch (and even the media seems to grasp this). Justice charged 
Blackwater’s employees—working under a State Department contract—as 
“supporting the mission of the [U.S.] Department of Defense.” That’s got 
to make someone at State uncomfortable, right? For this jurisdictional 
discussion, put aside any moral imperative (e.g., that high-profile bad 
actors should be prosecuted). Do companies that do business with State 
know (at the time they enter into their contractual agreements—at least 
one legal point in time that matters) that they are “supporting the [DOD] 
mission”? Do those companies’ employees know? On a related note, for a 
different perspective, consider that:
The government saw a need for highly experienced, highly 
trained Americans to protect our civilians abroad, and …selected 
Blackwater.
Every individual who has worked for Blackwater in Iraq has 
previously served in the U.S. military or as a police officer. Many 
were highly decorated.… [They] have been bound by detailed 
contracts that ensure intensive government direction and 
control. ...
While some of our critics seize upon inaccurate labels, I doubt 
they have ever known … our contractors personally or been 
protected by them. Our teams are not cooking meals or moving 
supplies. They are taking bullets. They are military veterans 
who have chosen to serve their country once again. Very few 
people know someone who would voluntarily go into a war zone 
to protect a person he has never met. I know 1,000 of them, and 
I am proud that they are part of our team.
Erik D. Prince, How Blackwater Serves America, Wall st. J. (Dec. 16, 
2008). Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D., Ill.) responded (also in the Wall st. J.): 
“Let’s be clear. Private security contractors are not soldiers who re-enlist. 
They are not part of the U.S. military. They do not wear the uniform of 
the United States, though the distinction is rarely made by those facing 
a gun shouldered by a Blackwater employee. ... It’s time to pass my Stop 
Outsourcing Security Act and phase out the use of private companies like 
Blackwater in combat zones before they get us in even more trouble.”
F. in Harm’s Way: The new Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA). 
Contractors—and their employees—are justifiably concerned about the 
new U.S.—Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which subjects con-
tractors and their employees to the Iraqi judicial system. See, Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the With-
drawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their 
Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq (Nov. 17, 2008), www.
abanet.org/contract/pdf/SE_SOFA_cln_opt.pdf. See also, Robert Brod-
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sky, Loss of legal immunity will change landscape for contractors in Iraq, 
Gov. exeC. (Dec. 5, 2008), www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?filepath=/
dailyfed/1208/120508rb1.htm (“’While we’re confident [that] State did 
not intend to put at risk the human rights of … civilians … providing es-
sential skills in support of Iraq reconstruction, we are disappointed and 
concerned that the document offers so few legal protections,’ said Doug 
Brooks, president of [IPOA.]”). The United Nations’ recent findings should 
be required reading for firms doing work in Iraq, their employees, and the 
firms that insure them:
Ongoing widespread ill treatment and torture of detainees by 
Iraqi law enforcement authorities, amidst pervasive impunity 
of current and past human rights abuses, constitute severe 
breaches of international human rights obligations and represent 
examples of challenges faced by the Iraqi government. …
UNAMI visits detention facilities and prisons to monitor the 
situation of detainees held by the ministries of Interior, Justice, 
Defence, and Labour and Social Affairs. Many have been 
deprived of their liberty for months or even years, often under 
harsh physical conditions, without access to defence counsel, 
or without being formally charged with a crime or produced 
before a judge. Continuing allegations of widespread torture 
and ill-treatment of inmates are of particular concern. Yet again, 
slow bureaucratic procedures, insufficient resources, degraded 
infrastructure and lack of effective accountability measures 
result in inordinate delays in processing detainees’ cases.
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, 
1 January – 30 June 2008, www.uniraq.org/documents/UNAMI_ 
Human_Rights_Report_January_June_2008_EN.pdf. It’s remarkable that 
a Govenrment so entirely dependent upon contractors to perform its most 
critical missions could be so cavalier about their contractors’ (and their 
employees’) well being.
Vii. CoMPLiAnCe, inTeGRiTY, eTHiCS, CoRRUPTion Con-
TRoL, AnD THe RiSinG TiDe oF AnTi-ConTRACToR 
SenTiMenT
A. Bad news Makes Bad Policy
[O]ver the past few years it has become almost impossible to 
open a newspaper and not read of some well-connected and 
obscenely compensated contractor foisting a colossal botch 
on the taxpayer. Contractors bungling the occupation of Iraq; 
contractors spinning the revolving door at the Department of 
Homeland Security; contractors reveling publicly in their good 
fortune after Hurricane Katrina.
Thomas Frank, Government by Contractor Is a Disgrace, Wall st. J. (Nov. 
25, 2008). This public perception is widely accepted and, in large part, 
seems to have been embraced by the incoming administration. David M. 
Nadler & Joseph R. Berger, Believe That Change Has Come for Contrac-
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tors, 31 leGal tImes (Nov. 20, 2008) (describing a reform agenda focused 
on “improving government contract management and oversight capacity, 
minimizing no-bid and cost-plus contractors, reducing spending on federal 
contracts, increasing transparency, and cracking down on tax-delinquent 
contractors.”). See also, change.gov/agenda/defense_agenda/:
Restore Honesty, openness, and Commonsense to 
Contracting and Procurement: ... [R]ealize savings by 
reducing the corruption and cost overruns that have become all 
too routine in defense contracting. ... [E]nd the common practice 
of no-bid contracting. ... [O]rder the Justice Department to 
prioritize prosecutions that will punish and deter fraud, waste 
and abuse.
Personally, we’d rather see the new administration talk about making the 
investments necessary to maximize the value for money the Govenrment 
receives for its more than $500 billion spent in the marketplace.
B. The new Compliance Regime: A (Roiling) Sea Change. As 
discussed elsewhere at length (particularly in the Chapters: Joseph D. 
West & Diana G. Richard on Corporate Compliance and Ethics; Agnes P. 
Dover & Thomas L. McGovern on Risk Mitigation; and Brian C. Elmer & 
W. Stanfield Johnson, on Fraud, Debarment & Suspension), Congress is 
mandating the contractor community make investments in compliance on 
a scale not experienced since the late 1980’s. The new compliance regime 
is as controversial as it is broad-reaching. But now it is required. That’s 
great news for the attorneys, accountants, auditors, investigators, and, 
frankly, the training and compliance communities.
See also, OFPP Memorandum, Preventing Fraud in Federal Contract-
ing (Nov. 14, 2008) (“The government remains committed to detecting 
and deterring fraud in federal contracting. … I ask that you advise your 
agencies of the affirmative steps being taken to combat and prevent this 
unacceptable activity, and reiterate the steps your agency is taking to 
deter fraudulent contracting actions in your agencies.”), available at www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/memo/preventing_fraud_111408.pdf; 
Louis D. Victorino & John W. Chierichella, The FAR’s ‘Contractor Busi-
ness Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements’ Require 
Significant Changes for All Government Contractors and Subcontractors, 
50 GC ¶ 439 (“to use the FAR council’s own words, it represents a ‘sea 
change’ in how the Government regulates federal contractors’); FAR Rules 
for Contractor Ethics Finalized, 50 GC ¶ 415; Christopher R. Yukins, U.S. 
Contractor Compliance Rules are Likely to Expand, 50 GC ¶ 147. See also 
the “Clean Contracting Act of 2008” included in the NDAA for FY 2009 
(and discussed at length in other chapters).
Of course, the new compliance regime will sap resources and change 
the way all parties do business (and not necessarily in a manner that 
increases the Govenrment’s value for money). 
Acquisition Workload and Ineffective Oversight Remain Top Concerns, 
PSC Finds, 50 GC ¶ 433; PSC, Acquisition in Transition, supra (“More 
than 90 percent of respondents reported that oversight has increased over 
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the past two years…. Participants saw a need for more effective oversight, 
focusing on systemic issues rather than anecdotes, and better training 
in procurement for auditors and oversight professionals. … [A]cquisition 
professionals believe ‘front-end’ process and skills improvements … will 
generate far more benefit than ‘back-end’ checking.”), available at www.
pscouncil.org/pdfs/2008PSCProcurementPolicySurvey.pdf; DHS Acquisi-
tion Oversight Still Needs Improvement, Critics Say, 50 GC ¶ 343; GSA 
CAO Must Improve Contract Oversight and Administration, IG Says, 50 
GC ¶ 316; Waxman Picks Up Contractor Fraud Inquiry, 50 GC ¶ 236.
On a related note, it wasn’t a particularly good year for DCAA. New 
DCAA Performance Metrics Emphasize Audit Quality, 50 GC ¶ 374; Com-
mittee Investigates DCAA Auditing Failure, 50 GC ¶ 335; DOD Independent 
Panel to Review DCAA, 50 GC ¶ 306; GAO Finds Extensive Problems in 
DCAA Auditing Practices, 50 GC ¶ 281. See also DCAA Memo, Audit Guid-
ance on Significant Deficiencies/Material Weaknesses and Audit Opinions 
on Internal Control Systems (Dec. 19, 2008, 08-PAS-043(R)) (“Effective im-
mediately, audit reports on contractors’ internal control systems that report 
any significant deficiencies/material weaknesses will include an opinion 
that the [entire?] system is inadequate.” (Emphasis and query added.)).
C. Purchase Cards: in the Weeds, Management Problems Re-
main. See, e.g., Garrett L. Hatch, Misuse of Government Purchase Cards 
(Congressional Research Service, July 30, 2008) (describing approximately 
$19 billion in purchase card transactions in FY 2007, and cataloging the 
Govenrment’s purchase card program weaknesses as: (1) ineffective trans-
action review and approval processes; (2) inconsistent program monitor-
ing; (3) lack of separation of duties (e.g., the same person approves and 
places the order); (4) inadequate training; (5) excessive number of cards 
issues and high credit limits; and (6) inadequate staffing levels (suggesting 
that approval authorities are overwhelmed by transaction volume). See 
also, OMB Responds to GAO Purchase Card Abuse Report, 50 GC ¶ 151; 
GAO Finds Purchase Card Abuse Unacceptably High, 50 GC ¶ 139, GAO, 
Governmentwide Purchase Cards: Actions Needed to Strengthen Internal 
Controls to Reduce Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Purchases, GAO-
08-333 (Mar. 14, 2008).
Using a statistical sample of purchase card transactions from 
July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, GAO estimated that nearly 
41 percent of the transactions failed to meet ... basic internal 
control standards. Using a second sample of transactions over 
$2,500, GAO found a similar failure rate—agencies could not 
demonstrate that 48 percent of these large purchases met the 
standard of proper authorization, independent receipt and 
acceptance, or both. …
[More specifically,] numerous examples of fraudulent, improper, 
and abusive purchase card use ... included ... purchase cards 
[used] to subscribe to Internet dating services, buy video iPods 
for personal use, and pay for lavish dinners that included top-
shelf liquor ... and one case where a cardholder ... embezzle[d] 
over $642,000 over a period of 6 years from the … Forest Service 
firefighting fund. 
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D. Defending Contractors in the Court of Public opinion? In 
light of these issues, much work needs to be done to educate the public, 
the media, the courts, Congress, and the President-elect.
no one is defending the contractors. …As story after story of 
wrongdoing by defense contractors leads nightly newscasts, 
generates above-the-fold, front-page headlines, and dominates 
editorial page focus, it has become increasingly important for 
these contractors to finally adopt new approaches to shape the 
debate, lest their detractors be the only ones telling the story. 
[Defense contractors]
1. ... must ensure full transparency and cooperation.
2. ... [must not] forget they have powerful messages to deliver on 
their own behalf that can win key support, or at least tolerance, 
on most ends of the political spectrum.
3. ... must define their limits of responsibility.
4. … should employ powerful images from Iraq and Afghanistan 
in all of their communication materials, highlighting the vital 
roles contractors play to support American military operations 
as well as keep the troops safe and American interests intact.
5. ... must develop a second-nature familiarity with relevant 
media.
6. ... must pick their spokespeople wisely and prepare them to 
face any audience—from high-authority bloggers to Congress.
7. ... must harness the power of technology, specifically the 
blogosphere, to disseminate accurate information and tell their 
story to their audiences.
Christopher Harvin & Babak Zafarnia, Taking the Stand: Contractors on the 
Defense, Wash. laW. (Oct. 2008), available at www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/
resources/publications/washington_lawyer/october_2008/stand.cfm.
Viii. PeRCoLATinG: oTHeR iSSUeS HeATinG UP
A. Procurement’s Role in The Financial Crisis Recovery Pro-
cess. The stakes are enormous. The target is changing and moving rapidly. 
It’s difficult to be optimistic. See, generally, Michael J. Schaengold, Robert 
K. Tompkins & Michael J. Lowell, The Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008-Procurement Issues, 50 GC ¶ 432; GAO, Troubled Assets Relief 
Program: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Integrity, Accountability, 
and Transparency, GAO-09-161 (Dec. 2008), available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09161.pdf; Grassley Presses Government to Use FCA to Fight 
Economic Stabilization Act Fraud, 50 GC ¶ 424.
B. Tanker Procurement: A Can kicked Down The Street. The 
Obama administration will inherit one of the hottest potatoes imagin-
able—the future of in-flight refueling for the Air Force. Because the tanker 
protest involved an incredibly important, high-profile procurement, it 
attracted (and, frankly, merited) extraordinary attention. Alas,
GAO found that [1] the record did not show that the Air Force, 
in its evaluation and source selection decision, applied the 
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identified relative weighting in assessing the merits of the firms’ 
proposals; [2] a key discriminator relied upon by the Air Force 
in its selection of Northrop Grumman’s proposal for award was 
not consistent with the terms of the solicitation; [3] the record 
did not show that the Air Force reasonably determined that 
Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft could refuel all current 
Air Force fixed-wing, tanker-compatible aircraft using current 
Air Force procedures ... and the Air Force did not reasonably 
evaluate the capability of Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft 
to initiate emergency breakaway procedures; [4] the Air Force 
conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing; 
[5] the Air Force improperly accepted Northrop Grumman’s 
proposal, even though that firm took exception to a material 
solicitation requirement; [6] the Air Force did not reasonably 
evaluate military construction costs in evaluating the firms’ 
cost proposals; [7] the Air Force improperly increased Boeing’s 
estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that 
firm’s most probable life cycle cost; [and, finally] the Air Force 
[unreasonably used] a simulation model to determine the 
amount by which Boeing’s non-recurring engineering costs 
should be increased in calculating that firm’s most probable life 
cycle cost. ...
Statement of Daniel I. Gordon, Air Force Procurement, Aerial Refueling 
Tanker Protest, GAO-08-991T (July 2008), available at www.gao.gov/new.
items/d08991t.pdf. See also, DOD Grounds KC-X Tanker Competition, 50 
GC ¶ 334; DOD Issues Draft Tanker RFP, 50 GC ¶ 292; Congress Weighs 
in on Tanker Dispute, 50 GC ¶ 243; DOD Reopens Tanker Procurement, 50 
GC ¶ 252; Congress Weighs in on Tanker Decision, Boeing Protests Award, 
50 GC ¶ 85; Air Force Tanker Award is a Shocker, 50 GC ¶ 76; Vernon J. 
Edwards, Boeing Versus the Air Force—The KC-45 Tanker Protest and the 
Future of Major System Source Selections, 50 GC ¶ 230 (“If the gentlemen’s 
agreement between contractors and the military services has broken down, 
as appears to have happened, and future major system procurements will 
be subject to protests, then the military services should seriously consider 
ways to simplify their source selection processes and reduce their vulner-
ability to procedural error.”); Jeffrey A. Green, Splitting the Baby—Why 
the Air Force Needs Two Tankers, 50 GC ¶ 353.
C. Green Procurement: Market Leadership or Salutary Sym-
bolism? All signs point to the Govenrment assuming a leadership role in 
galvanizing the green procurement movement. But the same signs suggest 
that the road may be quite bumpy. For now, it’s a developing landscape, 
and it seems to have limitless potential. See, e.g., David Nadler & Joseph 
Berger, OFPP Evaluating Proposed Policy on Procurement of ‘Green’ Prod-
ucts and Services, 50 GC ¶ 207; Green Procurement Policy Needs Refine-
ment, Commentors Say, 50 GC ¶ 127, 72 Fed. Reg. 73904 (Dec. 28, 2007). 
The proposed OFPP policy letter would require agencies to:
identify opportunities and give preference to the acquisition of 
green products and services, including but not limited to:
(1) Alternative fuels and alternative fuel vehicles and hybrids;
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(2) biobased products;
(3) Energy Star and Federal Energy Management Program 
(FEMP)-designated products;
(4) environmentally-preferable products and services;
(5) electronics registered on the Electronic Product Environmental 
Assessment Tool;
(6) low or no toxic or hazardous chemicals or materials or 
products;
(7) non-ozone depleting substances;
(8) recycled-content and/or remanufactured products; 
(9) renewable energy; and
(10) water-efficient products.
…
[Moreover,] Executive agencies shall ...[e]nsure representation 
of environmental and energy experts, managers, or technical 
personnel on integrated procurement teams for all major 
acquisitions and consider each of the following factors:  
(a) Sustainable design practices; (b) Life cycle cost analysis;  
(c) Product or packaging take back (return to manufacturer for 
recycling or remanufacturing purposes); and (d) Maximization 
of energy and resource recovery in solid waste management.
See also GSA Implementing Green Building Mandates, GAO Finds, 50 GC 
¶ 409; OFPP Memo Requests OMB Green Activities Survey Response, 50 
GC ¶ 392, OFPP Memorandum, FY 2008 Reporting on Green Purchasing 
Requirements (Oct. 20, 2008), available at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
procurement/green/fy2008_report_on_green.pdf; Agencies Acquiring 
Alternative Fuel Vehicles But May Not Be Using Alternative Fuel, GAO 
Finds, 50 GC ¶ 391.
iX. DeFenSe ReFoRMS 
When it comes to procurement, ... the trend has gone toward 
lower numbers as technology gains have made each system more 
capable. ... [T]hese platforms have grown ever more baroque, … 
ever more costly, … tak[e] longer to build, and are … fielded in 
ever-dwindling quantities. ... A given ship or aircraft, no matter 
how capable…, can be in only one place at one time.
… [M]eanwhile, the prevailing view has been that weapons and 
units designed for the so-called high end could also be used for 
the low end. And to some extent that has been true....
Nevertheless, given the types of situations [we are] likely to 
face ... the time has come to consider whether the specialized, 
often relatively low-tech equipment well suited for stability and 
counterinsurgency missions is also needed. …. [H]ow [can we] 
institutionalize the procurement of such capabilities and get 
them fielded quickly[?] Why was it necessary to go outside the 
normal bureaucratic process to develop technologies to counter 
improvised explosive devices, to build MRAPs, … to quickly 
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expand [our] ISR capability … [and] bypass existing institutions 
and procedures to get the capabilities needed to protect U.S. 
troops and fight ongoing wars? ...
[DOD] has to consider whether ... it makes sense to employ 
lower-cost, lower-tech aircraft … in large quantities.... [H]ow [do 
we] build this kind of innovative thinking and flexibility into 
the rigid procurement processes…. The key is to make sure that 
the strategy and risk assessment drive the procurement, rather 
than the other way around.
Gates, Balanced Strategy, foreIGn affaIrs, supra.
Presidential transitions often bring the promise of new opportunities 
and the threat of reversing key advances. With this in mind, the CSIS 
U.S. Defense and National Security Group and the Defense-Industrial 
Initiatives Group conducted a study aimed at informing the next Secre-
tary of Defense’s transition decisions. The CSIS study team focused on 
the little-understood organizational and process changes that the Bush 
administration has implemented in an attempt to improve the DOD’s in-
ternal operations in the categories of strategic direction, force development, 
force employment, force management, and corporate support. See www.
csis.org/media/csis/pubs/081209_hicks_transdeforg_web.pdf. The study 
team found that the attempted Bush administration defense reforms ran 
the gamut from qualified success to qualified failure. The study group’s 
top ten recommendations for the next Secretary of Defense are:
1. Acquisitions: Institutionalize recent guidance, restore a defense 
acquisition workforce, and provide cost realism in setting pro-
gram requirements.
2. Strategic Guidance: Establish three to five discrete and man-
ageable priorities and task the Director of Program Analysis & 
Evaluation (D(PA&E)) or other official to report quarterly on ef-
forts to achieve these priorities.
3. Program and Budget: Require the D(PA&E) or other official to 
assume all capability portfolio assessment responsibilities from 
the current capability portfolio managers and reinstitute sepa-
rate annual Program (Capability) and Budget Reviews.
4. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) 
Reorganization: Ensure at least ASD-level emphasis on nuclear, 
space, and cyber matters. Create Director for Strategy, Execu-
tion, and Assessment or realign Policy Planning and FT&R orga-
nizations under a single manager.
5. Joint Requirements: Add functional combatant commanders as vot-
ing members of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). 
Add the commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to 
the JROC as the Department’s Future Joint Force Advocate.
6. Unified Command Plan (UCP) Revisions: Direct the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff to undertake a 
zero-based assessment of the unified command plan and revisit 
the roles and responsibilities of USNORTHCOM, USJFCOM, 
and USSTRATCOM.
9-18
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West
NOTES
7. Joint Concepts: Direct CJCS to place a hold on all joint concept 
development except Joint Integrating Concepts and to create a 
Senior Advisory Panel to provide recommendations regarding 
the concept development process.
8. OUSD(I): With the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 
clarify USD(I) authorities and responsibilities in the Intelligence 
Community. Direct the CIO to serve as an approval authority on 
all relevant Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
(PPBS) and acquisition issues.
9. Adaptive Planning and Execution System: Require the Director, 
Defense Information Security Agency (DISA) to provide in-per-
son monthly reports on progress in deploying a full suit of en-
abling software for adaptive planning.
10. Future Security Environment: Direct selected defense officials to 
meet as a Futures Group to cultivate a shared understanding of 
DoD’s long-range fiscal, technological, geopolitical, and military 
operational projections.
Specifically, while the Bush administration explored a variety of al-
ternative approaches to acquisition reform, the element missing was a 
strong focus on implementation, execution, and follow-up. The alternative, 
of course, is to provide that focus—to institutionalize current initiatives, 
to provide cost realism to programs and requirements, to fund to those 
realistic costs, and to restore the capability of the acquisition system and 
workforce. 
Rebuilding the acquisition workforce—both military and civilian—is 
key to both major acquisition reform and contingency operations sup-
port. The administration should also continue efforts to redefine the role 
of contractors to eliminate, to the maximum extent possible, conflicts of 
interest.
Moreover, the Obama administration should institutionalize current 
initiatives on competitive prototypes, on the use of existing USD(AT&L) 
authorities to control requirements and cost growth, and on serious early 
program reviews and evaluations (pre-Milestone A). More importantly, 
costs need to be identified and programs adjusted to funding levels. The 
administration must review requirements for major programs in advance 
of the next quadrennial defense review (QDR), redefine baselines in accor-
dance with those requirements, and add cost realism as a key performance 
parameter for all programs.
Contracts in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts now equal 
or surpass contracts from procurement or from research and development 
accounts. Accordingly, cost and management controls are necessary for 
these O&M contracts, as well as better front-end requirements definition 
and back-end oversight of contract execution.
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